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Rationalism and the Modern State
Thinking about the law raises many problems, not least 
among them that of definition. The same is true of the 
State. Paul Valery said in this connection: "We easily 
speak of law, the state, race or property; but what is 
law, the state, race or property? We know and we do not 
know" (1).
The fact that there remains some mystery even after a 
definition has been attempted indicates that the 
question itself leads to the problem of origins; and 
this is a point where the foundations that should 
solidly underlie our reasoning are sadly lacking. As 
Michel Villey points out: "The history of the notion of 
the "subjective" right of the individual has yet to be 
written; it would be worth writing, though that could 
not be done without effort ..." (2).
Nevertheless, this subjective right is there; it 
defines us and as such acts with genuine material force 
in making our world what it is, even though there 
remains a mystery at the bottom of it. In taking as a 
subject for this paper that of rationalism and the 
state, we by no means intend to give a definition going 
back to the origins of the law or of the state. We 




























































































of what the state based on the rule of law seems to us 
to achieve.
For Max Weber, the distinctive character of modern 
Western law was the rationalization of law. Michel
Villey's studies have very largely corroborated this*
viewpoint (3). The process of rationalization takes 
place progressively, essentially over three centuries: 
the 16th century saw the emergence of a rationalization 
of the law, the 17t.h that of major syntheses and the 
18th took up the content of these 17th-century 
synthoses.
The work done by the 16th-century jurists in history of 
law was a major one: scholarly systems were
constructed, later to underlie the modern codifications 
of the late 18th century. The predominant idea was that 
of formulating definitions, of founding a system 
(Althussius) and "legal science in the strict sense, 
which is part of the broader entity of dicaeological 
science, would henceforth have as its object the study 
of subjective rigths" (4). The rationalization process 
had begun and was to occupy ever new ground.
After this stage of definitions, of the elaboration of 
systems, legal rationalism triumphs through the carrying 
out of two essential operations: a classification of




























































































"facts" and the "law" (Grotius). The consequence is 
that the law will be found in the rules pre-imposed on 
the judge and "to be found systematized in the treatises 
of doctrine" (5).
Likewise in the 17th century, mainly under the impetus 
of Descartes and in parallel with the rise of the 
sciences, a new philosophy arose: nature became what is
measurable, the quantitative; and chance and natural 
laws were transformed into accounting decisions (later, 
into governmental decrees (6)).
Modern science invaded the whole social field, and 
utilitarianism began to invade the philosophy of law: 
"Among so many philosophies elaborated and practised 
over so many years, it would be hard to cite a single 
one tending towards the benefit of mankind and the 
increasing of resources." "Let us then, my sons, leave 
aside all these abstract philosophies ... let us not 
seek the glory of founding a sect, but busy ourselves 
seriously with human wealth and greatness" (7).
Descartes' method goes back to the primacy of logic 
deduction and syllogism - as a privileged tool for the 
systematization of law; this induced the jurists of the y 
18th century to put the law in order. This idea of 
formal - order dominated the 18th century. A.J. Arnaud 




























































































legal knowledge constitutes one of the functions of 
legal thought. The other consists in the 
systematization of argumentation and conduct ... The 
law is well suited to be 'brought to reason'. The law's 
function is to maintain a social order ... there 
follows a need for formal coherence".
Legal rationalism in effect seeks the unification, 
simplification and systematization of legislation. The 
18th century was to see the fight against autonomous 
groupings, legal particularities: the rational need of 
merchants for predictability corresponded to the need 
for regularity of laws. The ambition was to apply the 
spirit of the sciences to the law. The influence of 
Euclid on the thought of Hobbes is well known. This 
science that attracted Hobbes was utilitarian, with the. -c -71 7P> ____ __ ___*--— --—
individual as its basis, and the law was to be a quality 
of the subject. This is where legal positivism would 
find its source (9).
This rationalism does not work solely in the law; we 
know that it tends to embrace all areas of social life. 
Nothing escapes it, all the more so because henceforth 
it was to be expressed through an incomparably well 
suited tool for the purpose, namely the state. There 
was a desire to see in the state a liberating structure: 
a state based on the rule of law as a counter to 




























































































of the 20th century, this view has been considerably 
moderated. Be that as it may, it is still admitted that 
this state based on the rule of law did organize 
liberty, and that in this connection 1789 was a major 
historical cutoff point. Our proposition would consist 
in showing that that point in history should be seen not 
so much as a break, but as a continuity, due to 
rationalism. To this end, a first part will be devoted 
to rationalism and the absolutist state, and a second 
part to a presentation of rationalism and the state 
based on the rule of law. We shall thus be leaving the 
area of the law proper - though we shall return to it 
for the conclusion - in order to seek to pick out the 
main lines it was henceforth to follow and to be defined 
along. This is because we regrd such an excursus as an 
essential preliminary to a consideration of the law, 
which though it does constitute a separate field of 
study is after all only one dimension of social life and 
derives its meaning from it alone. To forget that would 
be to condem oneself to fail to understand the major 
changes our law has gone through during the wohle of the 
modern epoch. As a guide along the way we have recourse 
to political science, for that is the science we feel 
best able to enlighten us about the State, the source of 
law in modern times.




























































































In view of the breadth and abundance of analyses done on 
this period, there seems no great need for descriptive 
analysis here of the absolutist state. It is instead 
our intention in this paper to seek to pick out the 
historical meaning underlying the creation of the 
absolutist state. This meaning was outlined by Alexis 
de Tocqueville as long ago as 1856 in his "l'Ancien 
Regime et la Revolution": "Administrative 
centralization is an invention of the Ancien Regime ... 
if then the centralism of the Ancien Regime could be 
transported in its entirety into the new society and 
incorporated therein, that is because this 
centralization was itself the beginning and the 
harbinger of this revolution" (pp. 76 - 116).
This centralism was a creation of rationalism. We shall 
look at it from two aspects: within the monarchical 
administration (I) and within civil society (II).
I. Rationality and the monarchical administration
Rooted in feudal society, the monarchical administration 
of the Ancien Regime in France was a political centre 
organized over the whole territory, thereby bringing 
about considerable development of the civil service. 
Many have seen in this (especially in recent analyses) 
the necessary manifestation of a new economy. 




























































































not essential to any fundamental economic phenomenon 
(10). If then such a power structure, meeting very 
specific needs, had become necessary, this was not 
solely for economic interests guaranteed by the law, but 
especially because the latter guaranteed authority 
situations.
Since the 16th century, trading companies have been 
organized in the basis of enormous capital requiring 
serious guarantees. This necessitated on the one hand 
the predictable application of the law, according to
t  r a d  i  t  i o n a L r u l e s ; a n d  o n  t h e o t h e r  t h e m o n o p o l
ccN
a r i d  r é g u l a i i o n  o l a l l  1 e g i  t i i n . i t  «• p o w e i r o f  t o n s t r a  i n t
through a single organism tending to universality. This 
fact posits the dissolution of all feudal power 
mechanisms. Finally (but only so) - and this effect is 
combined with those we have just mentioned - "the 
immobilization of the political and administrative 
apparatus" (11) accelerates the "primitive accumulation" 
of wealth.
The financial role of Paris was to be all the more 
important for the absence in the French kingdom of the 
institutional machinery for consent to taxation. The 
financial devices were extremely varied, going from 
bonds to the sale of public office. To provide its 
financial resources, the monarchical administration was 




























































































administration as its nucleus. But above all, this
fiscal state was to bring about a process of
rationalization whereby office, instead of being a mere 
source of tax revenue, became a factor for cohesion and 
for social integration, as being a technique for 
specifying public functions that rises above the feudal 
system. The efforts of the monarchy were concentrated 
on top-level staff, contributing towards welding them 
into a body lying outside the feudal network (12). The 
administration became the instrument of monarchical 
sovereignty, being hierarchical and understood as a 
moans of authoritarian government (13).
The need for a permanent, rigid administration 
conditioned the existence of the bureaucracy as a 
nucleus for any mass administration. 18th century 
capitalism represented the most rational economic 
foundation. Thanks to it, the bureaucracy could take on 
its most rational form, since it enabled it through 
taxation to control the necessary financial resources 
(14). The need for predictability and for confidence in 
the functioning of the legal and administrative 
organization led the new classes to hold the various 
forms of feudal power through a body whereby they 
controlled administration and finance and participated 
in changes to the legal organization. In fact, "the 
fixed-capital, profit-making firm, with a rational 




























































































private consumer market, is the form most sensitive to 
the irrationalities of justice, administration and 
taxation, which disturb the possibility of calculation 
(15). The increasingly important role played by written 
regulations was one of the practical manifestations of 
this process of rationalization, and explains the great 
importance assigned to lawyers in the period. The 
formalization (and legalization) of the law in fact 
accelerated the economy, already rational in form (16).
All this brings up the principle of legal domination, 
the purest type of which is bureaucratic administration. 
Legal domination and bureaucratic administration tend 
towards what may be called "objective domination" (A) 
which was to turn the recruitment procedure of the 
concours into the major tool of bureaucratic domination 
of the "purest" type (B). To that extent, we may 
consider this recruitment procedure as the manifestation 
of objectivized domination (and, conversely, its absence 
allows the existence of brakes to such a type of 
domination to be deduced).
A. Objective domination
Objective domination consists on the one hand of legal 
domination and on the other of rational domination.




























































































domination plays a part in objective domination by 
tending to exclude the arbitrariness of pure force - as 
the exercise of power. In this sense, legal domination 
is opposed to all forms of government that would 
ultimately depend on the arbitrary will of a subject. 
That is the function of the law. "Lawyers, and few but 
they, know from experience the truth that love of 
country proceeds from devotion to the law" (17). 
Objectivization is in fact brought about by the rule of 
law. This objectivization may be established rationally 
(pact, contract); it may be oriented towards 
"rationality as an end", as a value or as both (M. 
Weber) .
The essence of the law is a "cosmos" of abstract rules, 
intentionally decided, which rationally organize 
justice, the application of the rules, the 
administration, and control over the interests provided 
for through regulations, within limits laid down by the 
rules themselves (18). In terms of power, this also 
means that those who hold it exercise it in observance 
of the impersonal order whereby they orient their 
measures. Likewise, those who obey obey only the law: 
power resides in impersonal arrangements that put limits 
on objective competence which are rationally defined by 
the regulations themselves.




























































































in the last analysis ir the absence of appropriation of 
a post by its occupant. Its holder thus exercises a 
power which is the "right of the function", while he 
himself has only a "right to the function". This was 
far from already having been realised under the French 
Ancien Regime. The intendants under Louis XV readily 
confused "right of office" and "right to office". 
Furthermore, there was profound interference from "le 
fait du Prince" (to which 1789 was intended to give an 
answer; see below). However, the main steps towards 
achieving objective domination were taken in this 
period: the setting up of an administrative and 
bureaucrat ic power within which legal domination was 
conceived.
Firstly, as a mass administration, such a form of power 
was inevitable. Secondly, because technically it gives 
the best performance; it is "the most rational form" 
from the formal point of view. This performance is the 
result of very great specialization in knowledge (19), 
and it is therein that the great superiority of this 
form of power lies. On the other hand, bureaucratic 
administration means domination through knowledge (a 
specifically rational fundamental character for Max 
Weber, and the major political conflict of the 19th 
century in France was to centre principally on the 




























































































The second characteristic, of objective domination is 
that it is rational. This follows from the first 
characteristic and, taking up from Max Weber, we may 
reduce the fundamental categories of rational domination 
to four (20). These are the continous operation of a 
civil service, an administrative hierarchy, rules 
(techniques or norms) calling for professional training, 
and therefore for "competence" . In reality, these four 
characteristics interpenetrate. Thus, the combination 
of continuity and hierarchy produces what is known as 
"esprit de corps", which yet more strongly welds 
together both the hierarchy and the continuity. In the 
same way, the hierarchy becomes; an organized "cursus" 
through objective rules, and these two characteristics 
nourish each other. Finally, it is in the name of 
"competence" that these three characteristic of rational 
domination are founded.
1. The continuity of the civil service. The advantage 
of this power in both efficiency and rationality is that 
is made to last. By contrast with the form of feudal 
power, the exercise of a policy is not subordinate to 
the person responsible for pursuing it. "The king is 
dead, long live the king." The essence of this 
continuity is the objectivization of the power 
exercised. From the absolutist state, is in fact, 
brings about objectivization through institutions that 




























































































material and the symbolic heritage", a heritage which 
"may persist without the actors having continually to 
recreate it, in its entirety, through explicit action" 
(21). The ostentatiousness of the prince would 
obviously be contrary to a power regulated through rules 
and institutions (22).
2. Hierarchy: It is needless to insist on this point. 
Let us merely stress that the objective rule is all the 
more important in regulating this type of relationship 
because the hierarchy brings about a domination that
tends to appear as subjective (23)
3. Rules; These rules are to be understood in a broad 
sense; they are not only those through which state 
power is exercised, objectively over civil society, but 
also those that regulate the very individuals within the 
hierarchical administration: this is the place of the 
object and not of the subject (24). Thus, they are 
objective rules giving the subject his competence, 
understood as the area of duty of objective execution 
(25). But at the same time, these rules presuppose 
another "competence", that which depends on a 
specialized power (26).
4. A "competence". This means that, by contrast with 
personal authority which may neither be delegated nor 




























































































instrument for evaluating the positions of the 
functionary within a distribution allows equivalence 
relations to be set up ... Accordingly, the power and 
dependence relationships are set up not directly between 
persons; but, in objectivity itself, between 
institutions, i.e. between socially guaranteed titles 
and socially defined posts" (27).
The bureaucratic, hierarchicalized administration is 
organically linked to a hierarchical educational system. 
" A system of hierarchicalized examinations crowning 
speci f ic I raining and opening ent ry to specific careers 
appears along with the development of the needs of a 
bureaucratic organization which seeks to make 
hierarchicalized, comparable individuals correspond to 
the hierarchy of posts offered" (28). Max Weber 
continues: "To the purest recruitment (there 
corresponds) the purest bureaucratic domination" (29).
This purest recruitment was to be realized through the 
procedure of competition (30), and it is at least 
curious that this mode of recruitment is today to be 
presented to us as the outcome of the revolution, and 
therefore the highest form of "equality", at long last 
realized. As we have already said (31), it is not 
solely economic interests that are guaranteed by the 




























































































political, ecclesiastical and personal areas. 
Accordingly, a legal regulation may persist unchanged 
despite radical changes in economic relations. To be 
specific, the competition procedure as the
objectivization of the exercise of power by an
institution came out of the Council of Trent.
Consequently, seeing the origin of this procedure in the 
19th century (32) and its basis in a supreme 
materialization of the principle of equality means 
making a double error. On the one hand historically 
which is trivial - but above all, that of failure to 
perceive what this legal technique represents: it is
first and foremost cooptation by a constituted body. 
(The law organizes an authority situation; that such a 
procedure should have come into being at the time of the 
Reformation is surely not without significance).
B. Competitive examination as the manifestation of the 
purest bureaucratic domination
We shall not here go into what competition procedure 
achieved under the Council of Trent (33). We shall 
however point out that the legal system of competitive 
examination set up by the Council was precisely that of 
the competitive examinations of modern lay states, or 
that set up by, for instance, the European Economic 
Community. Let us simply recall that an institution as 




























































































organization set up by the Christian church in the West. 
Christian universalism in fact amounted to a vast 
administrative system, increasingly hierarchicalized as 
history advanced (34). At the same time and in 
parallel, an educational system had been set up (35).
The procedure of competitive examination thus saw the 
light because these two elements existed, and the two 
criteria that served as a basis for the "sounding" of 
the candidate were on the one hand the absorption of 
standard knowledge, and on the other the certainty for 
the constituted body that the candidate would be "useful 
and profitable". Thus, this practice was to last 
throughout the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. The 
educational beacon of the 18th century was that of the 
Jesuits (to whom the competitive examination procedure 
at the time of the Council is due), which turned out a 
"homo hierarchicus". Under their control, the faculties 
served only for conferring the degrees necessary for the 
conferment of certain benefices (36), and the content of 
the teaching was completely cut off from the concerns of 
the moment (37). The point was "not to judge the past 
with the ideas and the cast of mind of the present"; 
the renewal of scientific and philosophic thought took 
place outside them (38).
Nevertheless, the new classes were to take up this form 




























































































educational institution with particularly efficient 
means for imposing the hierarchy's educational cult and 
hence the educational hierarchy itself, and by putting 
these means at the service of the autonomization of 
educational life by giving it a complete culture 
completely cut off from life, the Jesuits' educational 
invention enabled this institution to specify its 
generic tendency to autonomization in the primacy 
conferred on the function of self-perpetuation" (39).
This was in fact what the new classes were to achieve:
a readjustment of the power mechanisms - an
objectivization through this function of
self-perpetuation. "Before the system of machinery 
assuring by its own notion the reproduction of the 
established order is set up, it is not enough for the
rulers to simply let the system they control run by
itself if they are to exercise their rule durably ...
Being incapable of contenting themselves with
appropriating the profits of a social machine as yet 
unable to find within itself the power to perpetuate 
itself, they are condemned to the elementary forms of 
domination , i.e "the direct domination of one person 
over another" (40).
This is precisely what legal and rational domination 
seeks to avoid, and the first experiments at the 
"purest" bureaucratic domination begin to see the light. 




























































































consequence of the monarchical administration of the 
18th century, far from seeking the destruction of the 
state was instead itself to be mediatized through a 
state power meeting its own needs. The slogan of this 
mediation was the principle of equality, understood as 
equality of access to public employment. The first 
historical example we find is that brought about by the 
school of the Ponts & Chaussees (41). This was not by 
chance: the rationalization of trade presupposed the 
rationalization of the circulation of goods, which in 
turn meant new men. These were the engineers.
Louis XV's minister Trudaine organized, in rationality, 
a ministry (42) which was to be a centre of technical 
training where one could, through successive stages, 
reach the grade of ingenieur. The knowledge acquired 
was based on the exact sciences, among which mathematics 
predominated (43). Trudaine decided that all Ponts & 
Chaussees engineers would henceforth be chosen from this 
school: the monarchical administration became a 
professional centre, bringing about a monopoly 
situation. The four fundamental categories of rational 
domination were combined in it; the young ingenieur, 
subject to severe obligations, had no rights vis-a-vis 
the administration. Being bound by professional 
secrecy, he was the state's devoted servant. His first 
duty was obedience to his superior. His training was to 




























































































professionalobjective execution of duty and as 
training.
When Louis XV once suggested a nominee of the Marquise 
de Pompadour for a post of chief engineer, Trudaine 
opposed this, and the appointment was not made. For the 
first time, legal domination was imposed: the
objectivization of the exercise of power through the 
rule of law began to be realized.
I1. Rationality and social equality
The appearance of national and territorial aspects
destroyed the foundation of feudal power. The
distinction between the "public" and the "private" was 
not current within feudal society (44), and Louis XIV's 
monarchy redefined a territorial policy (45). This 
state which was constituing itself brought into being a 
social sphere which tended to detach itself from the 
state. The exercise of power realized through 
representation, i.e. power affirmed by a subject
constrained to an ostentatory role, was counterposed to 
a state which, through its bureaucracy and its army, 
rendered itself independent of the court. It was no 
longer necessary for power to be shown, and "it asserted 
itself more solidly as a tangible partner to those 




























































































These latter were private persons, excluded from the 
"public power", and public became a synonym for 
governmental. Private economic activity became based on 
a wider exchange of commodities, and placed under the 
control and guidance of the public sphere. This 
tangible partner" that the absolutist state was becoming 
brought about the birth of what was henceforth to be its 
counterpart: "the public sphere", i.e. the area of 
"continous participation in the exercise of reason, 
controlling the "public powers" and therefore developing 
within the political sphere.
in this connection, the hard core of the modern public 
sphere is made up of all the officials of the 
monarchical administration, above all the lawyers. To 
these should be added the representatives of the modern 
economic world: manufacturers, bankers, traders, 
educated people. The circles of educated landowners 
were the foundation, under the leadership of 
intellectuals, professors, lawyers, doctors, teachers, 
chemists, manufacturers, landowners etc. for the local 
political clubs, the basis for this public sphere.
This public sphere developed to the extent that the 
public interest in the private sphere was not defended 
by the authorities alone, but taken over by the 
subjects, who saw it as their own business. For this 




























































































the two terms of the ambivalence which characterized the 
authority/subject relationship" (47). It was precisely 
this area wher power came into relation with private
persons through the intermediary of the royal
administration that will be the object of critical
discussion.
The new society that was consolidating in the face of
the state delimited a private area vis-a-vis the 
authority; but at the same time, it made the
reproduction of existence into a matter of public 
interest. It was precisely there that the dominating 
political expression - royalty - became antinomic to the 
ruling political expression - the new classes.
The Ancien Regime was marked politically by the king's 
mediating role between the various estates. The third 
estate, in this organization of power, could not present 
itself as a state controlling any power: "The power to
dispose of property was part of the private sphere, and
accordingly the new classes - as private persons
exercised no power" (48).
For this reason, contrary to the feudal political
demands, their demands on the authorities were not 
directed against the concentration of political 
authority which was to be distributed. (This idea was 




























































































judiciously points out: "L'idee de l'Etat"). On the
contrary, they attacked the principle defended by the 
established powers: the control principle that the
"public" opposed to the latter was aimed at transforming 
the nature of the domination (49).
The need expressed by the public through the use it made 
of reasoning necessarily led if it were to succeed in 
imposing itself, to more than the mere redistribution of 
the bases for which the domination drew is legitimacy 
(50). By opposing the Court in cultural and political 
connections, the town - the location of trade
represented a "literary public sphere" whose 
institutions were the cafes, salons, meetings etc. Well 
before the public character of power was disputed by the 
political reasoning of private persons, this literary 
public sphere constituted the ground for public
argument, and represented the process by which private 
persons analysed and criticized among themselves the 
personal experiences they had within the new private 
sphere (51) .
Progressively, the literary discussion was to become 
political, i.e. the place where the public character of 
power was to be disputed through the political reasoning 
of these private persons. This was the middle of the 
18th century. The new classes were excluded from state 




























































































and the monarchical administration was the centre of 
power. In this political and social environment, the 
salons formed a special enclave where the nobility and 
the big bourgeoisie, the bankers and administrators, 
could meet on an equal footing. ."It was less the 
political equality of the members of these societies 
than their exclusion in general from the political area 
reserved to absolutism that was decisive" (52). Social 
equality was initially possible only as equality outside 
the bureaucratic administration. The "legitimacy" came 
firstly from outside the bureaucratic administration, 
and the point was always to investigate that apparatus, 
not to transform it (53).
The political function of the "critical" public sphere 
was to assure control over civil society. In the
discourse of Reason, right was to be opposed to 
absolutism. This public opinion felt itself to be the 
only legitimate source of these laws; "voluntas" became 
transferred into "ratio" (54). The rule of law, 
identical for all, had the aim of an minilating all 
forms of "voluntarist" domination. The idea of a state 
based on the rule of law, of norms legitimated by public 
opinion, goes back to a rational - objective 
regulation of power, which can be expressed in the most 
total manner, as we have seen, only through the





























































































But at the same time, this absolutist state accelerated 
the economic rationality whereby the market, 
subordinated to the administrative authority of the 
prince, tended to become detached from the obligations 
linking it into the corportions. The prince was, to be 
sure, "in the last instance" a brake on rationalism, but 
he nevertheless remained a potantial ally in 
disentangling the market from feudal cluches.
1789 was hence to appear as a political revolution; the 
point was to get rid of the prince, but above all
because he was a brake on rationalism; this wan to be 
lhe second character is! Lc ol the revolut ion: 
rationalist more than individualist.
What did 1789 achieved* A new legitimacy, which amounted 
to a broadening of the state field. Two spheres were 
henceforth to coexist within the state based on the rule 
of law: the political public sphere, corresponding to 
the aspect of the subject and functioning through 
publicity, and the state sphere, the bureaucratic 
administration, structured by secrecy and corresponding 
to the aspect of the object.
1789 was finally to bring about a liberalization of the 
market: government direction and corporatist regulation 
affecting industry and commerce and acting as a brake on 




























































































rationalism and not of individualism; article 2 of the 
Loi Chapelier (14/7/1791; article 1 abrogates 
corporatist regulations) shows us that ther issue went 
further: "Citizens in the same estate or profession, 
business people, shopkeepers, workers, or members of any 
guild whatsoever may not when assembled appoint any 
chairman or secretary or syndic nor keep records, take 
decisions or arrive at conclusions, nor draw up 
regulations on their supposed common interests".
Had the revolution been individualist, such an article 
would never have seen daylight. Furthermore, what this 
shows, and this is very important, is that the 
"sovereign" subject was in fact sovereign only within 
the limits asigned to him by the state. Throughout the 
whole epoch of the "liberal state", this point was to be 
obscured, notably by the lawyers, in both doctrine and 
jurisprudence, to reappear - all of a sudden - only with 
the Third Republic, i.e. with the "social state" (see 
conclusion).
It was a perverse effect of this revolution - cf. our 
point II - that while before 1789 the individual was not 
attached to the state , it was precisely 1789 that 
attached the subject to the state, making a constitutive 
dimension of it. The subject was then defined by the 
state, according to what was a nature of the latter, 

























































































































































































Part II: Rationalism and the state based on the rule of
law
The state based on the rule of law, as we have said, is 
the intermeshing of two factors - the public sphere, the 
bureaucratic administration - that of the subject and 
that of the object. This intermeshing is not static; 
by definition it could only be evolutionary. Moreover, 
this was taken account of in the evolution of the 
liberal state into the social state. We shall study 
this evolution from two aspects: the irrationalism and 
the rationalism of the state based on the rule of law.
A. Rationality at grips with disorder
Where the constitutional regime was formally sanctioned 
by a legality on which it was based (the constitution), 
the functions of the public sphere were clearly defined 
(55) .
This means firstly that discussion, among the public, 
presupposed the questioning of areas which hitherto had 
not been subject to discussion. In fact., a first series 
of fundamental rights concerns the public sphere that 
uses reason (freedom of opinion and the press) and the 
political functions that private persons carry out 




























































































Secondly, this means, that this commerce of society, far 
from presupposing a social identity, on the contrary 
presupposes an equality founded upon the value of the 
person and hence, in principle, this public cannot be 
closed upon itself: anyone may take a part in it. 
Thus, a second series of fundamental rights refers to 
the free status of the individual, to the principle of 
equality obeyed by proprietors on the market and by 
educated people.
The principle of equality was first of all a principle 
of civil society, and was to remain so throughout the 
lfltli century. That is to say, the constitutional nouns 
aimed at producing a model of civil society, but the 
reality of it in no way corresponded. The idea of 
access to all public careers, open to all, was at the 
origin of the bourgeois public sphere, but was also the 
principle that was its stumbling block (56).
This public sphere of the 19th century remained literary 
even where it assured political functions, and education 
was the first condition to fulfill if one wished to 
belong to it, with ownership being the second. Social 
antagonisms were to appear for the securing of state 
power; a process of permanent purgation was to be the 





























































































The legitimacy that emerged from 1789 was founded upon 
dialogue: here parliament was the place for critiscal 
dicussion. But the executive, for its part, conserved 
this administrative State to make it its mode of 
government, where power was not discussed.
All the rules of private law are the object of 
negotiation, like constitutional law, but public law is 
not the object of discussion. The public sphere, as 
legally delimited, becomes the ruling principle of the 
procedures within the state organs; in this sense there 
appears publicity (parliamentary debates, etc.). But to 
the extent that the influx proper to their functioning 
comes from the public sphere, they appropriate it to 
themselves in a quite specific manner as soon as it has 
to be applied through their apparatuses.
At the end of the Napoleonic experience, the powerful 
administration found the monarchical reflex again. This 
mean chiefly that it reacted to political control when 
imposed from above. The administration can really 
direct only by intermediary of a mode of authoritarian 
government (57).
Power resides in the formula: "The state is democratic 
from without". With the particularity that, in the 
period going from the First to the Second Empire, the 




























































































the authoritarian practice of power on the other had not 
yet been achieved. It was to be only in the Third 
Republic.
In fact, while the political public sphere appeared as 
the place where social antagonisms were expressed, the 
state apparatus with its executive administration as a 
privileged means of the exercise of power was unable to 
support the existence of internal disruptions. The 
officials thus appear to be at the service of the 
collectivity; their action was inspired by concern for 
the general interest. They are not wage earners like 
others: the civil service became be subjective? to a 
single imperative: hierarchy (58).
Hierarchy, which transforms the subject into object in 
such a way that everyone sees his compitence delimited 
by rules - i.e. objectively - was to have difficulties 
in imposing itself during this period of the liberal 
state at the top of the state apparatus. The social 
antagonisms of the public sphere were translated at each 
election into a crowd of "direct" appointments, thereby 
provoking a strong politicization of that apparatus.
In such circumstances, the process of objectivization 
set up for access to power was very much slowed down: 
it was to become a major political and social phenomenon 





























































































Altough the functions of the public sphere are clearly 
defined by the Constitution, the legal value of that 
constitution is not therefore defined: "It was to be 
necessity, circumstances, that determined the 
possibility and conditions of their changes" (59). And 
to the question who constitutive power belongs to, the 
following reply was given: " To those who have the 
power to seize it: it would be dangerous to stir up 
this problem of constitutive power, which has something 
mysterious in it, the source of which it would be unwise 
to disentangle" (60).
This problem regarding the exercise of government comes 
down to the impossibility of systematizing a process 
whereby the securing of state power is objectivized.
With 1789, "the equality of access to public employment" 
resulted from the principle of election behind which 
could be found the owners, rich merchants, and that 
practice was soon to become incompatible with 
Bonaparte's administrative work. No doubt because for 
him administration was not the place for the subject as 
conceived within the public sphere , but the place where 
the subject disappears behind a mechanical functioning 
of norms (61). But much was still required before such 




























































































decree of 14 Friinaire Year II (articles 20 - 21) had set 
up a veritable permanent purge in the communes and 
districts; this decree was to be "canonized" a few 
years later under the name of "theory of government 
acts". This theory was intended to legitimize all 
attacks on officials without the Conseil d'Etat being 
able to exercise the least control, on the grounds that 
the decision was of a political nature (62).
This limit to the "purest bureaucratic domination" set 
up by political conflicts arising from the public sphere 
likewise brought about a limit to the "purest 
recruitment", i.e. the procedure of competitive 
examination.
A limit only; in fact, the imperial university was one 
of Bonaparte's first concerns: "there will be no fixed 
political state if there is not a teaching body with 
fixed principles" (63). In other words, the educational 
organization was to be the reproduction of the state 
administration, and its model was to be the Jesuit 
colleges of the 19th century: the organization of 
studies, the disciplinary system, the system of classes, 
boarding, etc,, were reestablished (64), and, of course, 
so was hierarchy. There was a hierarchy among the 
taught and among the teadhers, and, as we noted for the 
18th century, educational hierarchy was imposed in the 




























































































its own hierarchy inside the educational hierarchy.
Only a limit, again, because the principle of objective 
regulation within the state apparatus organized by the 
competitive examination was no longe at dispute. 
Bonaparte to Napoleon III the principle was never to be 
questioned again; quite the contrary. Since everyone 
had understood that the primary issue was cooptation by 
a constitued body, the members of the selection board 
and the content of the programmes would change with the 
regimes, but the principle of the competitive 
examination was not to be touched (66).
Furthermore, the link between state education and 
bureaucratic administration can perhaps be maintained 
only if the State holds a monopoly position in 
education. That was what the system was evolving 
towards. The educational hierarchical sequence tended 
to become purely governmental (67); it led to state 
examinations where the examiner had been trained within 
the state apparatus and were state professors. The 
diploma thereby became a professional qualification 
excluding any others. A number of authors were to speak 
against this. In those troubled times, everyone could 
see that depending on who was in power, such and such a 
type of a candidate was inevitably accepted and such and 
such another equally inevitably rejected. To speak like 




























































































formal rationality as far as the object goes, the public 
nature of the competitive examination procedure, but 
also a formal value rationality, with the selection 
board deciding by secret procedures. In the 18th 
century (68) it was through the competitive examination 
procedure that professorial chairs passed from father to 
son, with scruplous respect for legality. This is 
precisely the point: the transmission of a heritage. 
The blood heir of the 18th century was to be succeeded 
by the spiritual heir of the state based on the rule of 
law, where the choice was no longer made "primitively" 
(from subject to subject) but through the mediation of 
permanent and objective rules.
Therein lies the major limit to the competitive 
examination procedure in the 19th century. "The liberal 
state, its mode of construction, the extremity of its 
powers, its style in submitting ... were rooted in a 
religion, i.e. a system of belief that brought about 
authority" (69). The history of canon law shows that 
administrative law in the modern sense could not arise 
without a scaffolding of beliefs bringing the political 
element to the fore" (70).
The belief system worked out within the educational 
institution, impregnated with utilitarianism and 
rationalism, was ceaselessly questioned by the 




























































































to the substance (i.e., as to the very existence of the 
competitive examination). "Belief system" and 
"political respondent" are linked. To the possibility 
of setting up beliefs that structure the state apparatus 
corresponds the possibility for a society of creating a 
form of power that will maintain the social order on 
which that society is based. In other words, 
cooptation, on specialized knowledge, requires not only 
teaching and administrating but also an order on the 
basis of which it is auto-legitimized.
What the political sphere of the 19th century in France 
expresses is precisely these constantly unsuccessful 
attempts of a society seeking to structure itself.
"The principle of the effectiveness of this performative 
language - the beliefe system in Pierre Legendre - which 
brings into existence what it describes, which magically 
creates what it says in constitutive statements, rests 
not ... in the language itself, but in the group that 
authorizes it, which is authorized by it, which 
recognizes it and which recognizes itself in it" (72).
One of the primary effects of this phenomenon is that a 
considerable number of legimacy problems can never be 
discussed; constitutional law, like administrative law, 
cannot be the object of theorization (cf. page 4 above 




























































































constitutional law and administrative law for the 
assignment of a professioral chair could never exist 
throughout the 19th century.
No teacher of administrative law or constitutional law 
teaching in the 19th century was in fact appointed by 
competitive examination (73). Taking as example the 
University of Paris, the two chairs in Roman Law were 
assigned by competition, as were the six in civil law. 
The chair in Administrative Law was assigned by 
ordinance, as was that of Constitutional Law. At Dijon, 
all the chairs were assigned by competition, except that 
oL Administrative Law. The same was true at Rennes, 
where the chair of Administrative Law was assigned to 
Laferriere by ordinance, etc.
With the teaching of law essentially in the hand of 
integral monarchists, cooptation to constitutional law 
was all the more difficult to bring about because 
discussion on the foundations of the issue went back to 
a conception of politics that was considerably different 
from the one for which those organizing the cooptation 
were opting (74). On the other hand, the competitive 
examination for a chair in Roman Law or Civil Law, in 
Latin, posed no problem.
Rationalism had dominated 1789 and was at the basis of




























































































defined a sphere whose political functioning was a 
permanent obstacle to the rationalism of the 
bureaucratic administration. The whole of the 19th 
century was for this reason a "rationality at grips with 
disorder" . /■
The first forms of order in the public sphere came from 
the political parties - centralized and hierarchical - 
set up by professional politicians. But the order that 
best organized rationality was the republic, in 
particular the Third Republic, i.e. the form of 





























































































II The Republic, as rationalist form of the state 
based on the rule of law
Any movement coming out of the public political sphere 
is a danger for the order, i.e. for the "bureaucratic 
society", which is principally a "technique aiming at 
efficiency" (75); this public sphere is a constitutive 
dimension of the state based on the rule of law. There 
lies the whole contradiction of the parliamentary 
regime. The only solution consists then in bringing 
this parliament to calm, i.e. in breaking its political 
power or more exactly in organizing it. This consisted 
in making parliament into the place for a "publicity", 
carried out by professional politicians within parties, 
reproducing the organization and functioning of the 
state apparatus, hierarchical and centralized as it was.
Accordingly, the republic sought to set up this blending 
of democratic practice of power and an authoritarian 
practice, a blending of the binomial of dialogue and 
rational authority.
For this reason the republic must appear more as a form 
of transformation of liberal 19th-century society rather 
than as one of conservation.
We have seen (above) that the principle of the political 




























































































precisely this point that was the stumbling block for 
this sphere. The principle was to be realized with the 
republic, and through the operation of a double 
mediation, from society towards the State and from the 
State towards society: which brought about the "social 
state".
The mediation from society towards the State was the 
creation of the associations (76), (of political 
parties, of places where private interests required the 
State to make temporary compromises) which fundamentally 
remained private bodies organizing relations between 
parliament and civil society. These organisms 
accordingly reproduced the mode of operation of the 
State, in the sense that they sought to secure from the 
"vassalized" public a plebiscitary support based on 
political integration of the social body (77).
J. Habermas thus points out that "in the 18th century, 
publicity had to be imposed by opposing secrecy in 
politics, and at our time it is only with the help of a 
policy of secrecy practised by interest groups that 
publicity is imposed" (78).
Thus, the social State is the state form that realizes 
the aspiration of the political public sphere; in fact, 
the principle of equality access to public employment 




























































































But at the same time parliament becomes a place of 
spectacle, the existence of which remains no less 
essential because it remains more than ever the sphere 
where one shows that power is a matter of reason, the 
reason of the sovereign individual/subject. There will 
always be a great temptation to stifle parliament, but 
the latter, as an ostentatory body where power is 
legitimated through reason, can only live. The way to 
transcend the contradiction consists in steadily 
weakening the parliament - to the benefit of the 
bureaucratic administration - while considerably 
increasing its publicity.
The period of open war (liberal period) was succeeded by 
the peace, which consisted in a withdrawal of the 
dominant social groups from the stage of power. "Thus, 
the executants of power .. are distinct from the power 
itself, which arises independently of them" (80).
Parliament is the offical locale for criticism of power; 
constitutional law - the supreme norm of the machinery 
of legal rationality - becomes the wise and reasoned 
expression of the public sphere, a hierarchicalized, 
centralized sphere where publicity becomes propaganda. 
(81) .
The second aspect of this mediation from society towards 




























































































civil society: equal access to public employment 
becomes a reality. For this reason, the passage from 
the liberal State to the social state takes place 
without break and results from the very character of the 
political public sphere, open to all. This movement of 
civil society towards the State is then accompanied by 
the movement of the State towards civil society.
The mediation of the State towards civil society is the 
convincing achievement of the process of rationality 
undertaken by the state based on the rule of law. In 
this sense, the administrative law was to be a process 
of milling and modelling the subject on the basis of 
which the critical public sphere functions. The 
heterogeneity of the public sphere was to be tempered by 
the homogeneity of the state apparatus. Free play was 
to be assumed on the one hand by the hierarchical 
principle, and on the other by the republican notion of 
the State, as the articulation of the binomial of the 
between general interest and official neutrality.
As J. Chevallier and D. Loschak (82) say, "no state 
apparatus can admit the existence of internal splits", 
"The officials are at the service of the generality; 
their actions are inspired by concern for the general 
interest .. The functioning of the state apparatus is 
subject to a single impelling force: hierarchy, which 




























































































takes the form of a centralization of the powers of 
decision and of control of inferior grades by superior 
grades" (83).
This normative model aims primarily at forbidding 
expression of the antagonisms that run through this 
state apparatus: the social heterogeneity of 
recruitment is necessary because it brings about equal 
access to public employment, the main guiding principle 
of the political public sphere. But this 
heterorgeneity, as a source of disorder, was to be 
opposed by a process of functional homogeneity in the 
state apparatus.
Since the state apparatus becomes increasingly a mass 
apparatus, the social stratifications of civil society 
became transported into it and there appear two great 
categories of state officials: those charged with 
execution and those charged with conception (84).
"There is a break in the unity of the administrative 
milieu and an increasingly clear divergence between the 
two previously hierarchicalized cultural models: that 
of the upper administration and the grands corps, based 
on the cult of the state, of the general interest of 
efficiency; and that of the small and middle officials, 
seeking in the administration above all security of 




























































































The point then becomes to express what the 
administration ought to be, and the model picked will be 
the military model, which expresses in the purest 
possible manner the ideal of such a structure.
The first shot was fired by Hariou (32), for whom the 
administration ought to be a vast army with a general as 
its head. All theoreticians of public law were to take 
up this theme.
Fayol (87) thought that "the essential principle of 
administrative doctrine is the extreme importance of 
leadership, since organization is the science of 
command".
Chardon (88) said: "To bring the masses into motion, to 
remind them of the goal and help them to reach it, to 
stop them in their dangerous leaps, protect them against 
anarchy, there is need of superior wills, tenacious 
permanent, rigorous and disinterested".
It is through administrative law that one passes from 
the government of men to the administration of things, 
the highest stage of democracy in the social State.
The conception of power becomes military: 
administrative law and military rationalism meet. Real 




























































































Headquarters, during the Great War, was doing in fact no 
more than applying the essence of the rules that 
administrative doctrine was later to promote: the unity 
of command, with at the top a commander-in-chief as 
dispenser of energy. Below, the offices and services 
that supply the chief with all the elements of knowledge 
he requires, and pass on to the troops the impulses 
coming from the chief".
Lyautey (90) explained that "there are not two ways of 
exercising a colonial command, but only one: it calls 
for qualities which are both military and civilian, or 
more exactly administrative .." The role of 
administrative doctrine then forms part of the logical 
codification of rules needed in any good organization. 
But we owe the most powerful formulation to Tarde (91) 
who explained that the carrying out of a good colonial 
command "presupposes two distinct elements: a human 
machine (92) perfectly attuned to the object to be 
attained: organization. An impulse that sets it in 
motion and drives it: command. Administrative law is 
intended to be precisely that: a mechanical arrangement 
of rules governing objects" (93).
We would wish to take over the position of J. 
Chevallier and D. Loschak (94) when they feel that 
"before being justified by a concern for technical 




























































































hierarchical principle is inspired by the desire to 
assure the political cohesion of the administration". 
But on condition of seeing that this desire for
political cohesion has as its goal a concern for 
efficiency, i.e. for limiting anything that may
constitute a break on rationalism, which knows only 
efficiency (95).
The process of objectivization that the practice of
power tends to realize in a state based on the rule of
law has as its starting point the critical public
sphere, and as destination the state apparatus. The
double motion required - mediation from society towards
the State and from the State towards society - then 
makes the educational apparatus into the essential organ 
for the rationalization of these two mediations.
It is in fact the hierarchy of knowledge that is to 
legitimize hierarchical power: "To each according to 
his merit". The rationalist process that the 
educational apparatus permits consists in excluding 
voluntarism for the benefit of objective rules organized 
around specialized knowledge. This takes up from a long 
history (see part I above) which draws its his source 
from the State Church. "Teaching was organized because 
it was necessary to convert (we say convince) evangelize 
(we say politicize), in order that the people of God 




























































































The homogeneity of the state apparatus was in fact to 
result from the joint action of two factors: one factor 
internal to the administration, consisted in admitting 
the hierarchical principle as the principle ruling the 
functioning of the service. The other, external to the 
administration, was that of training future officials by 
specific education, where knowledge was inculcated 
within a hierarchical conception.
The principle of criticism-characteristic of the 
political public sphere - was thus converted into a 
principle of integration. In the years leading up to a 
professional qualification, reaching a specific 
hierarchy of specialized acquired knowledge corresponds 
to a hierarchical level within the state apparatus or 
civil society.
This principle of integration, rationally organized, 
must inevitably become accentuated. A considerable 
number of types of special education were to be set up 
for access to public emplyment. R. Castagne de la 
Jarousse writes in this connection (97): "The 
administration fears the University, because within it 
there develops an oppositional mentality ". This 
teaching effectuates recruitment "on the basis of a 
special mentality and training, where the spirit of 
discipline is sovereign" (98): recruitment does not 




























































































administration, but by a detour through specialized 
bodies that subsequently automatically decant their 
pupils into the state apparatus. The training one 
receives there "remains theoretical and is not a 
preparation for the job; it consists of the acquisition 
of a "general culture", of "round tables". "Competence 
"is not primary in it, and disappears behind the ideal 
image of an official (99).
Conclusion
Now that the framework in which the law will act has 
been set out, we may summarize the jurists' debate 
within the state based on the rule of law, in particular 
on the basis of ideas of subjective right and objective 
right.
Jurists concealed the nature of the revolution: 1789 
was considered as the moment of the subject. In other 
words, the aspect of the public sphere was primary and 
supplanted the administrative and bureaucratic sphere. 
The legal argument is simple: the Constitution is the 
supreme source of the legal order, and the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man expresses its foundation and its 
goal. Through the social compact, individuals/subjects 
have in a sovereign manner set up limits within which 
liberty would be expressed (Rousseau). The 




























































































whereby the pact will be respected (100).
In consequence, the state based on the rule of law was 
to be this mechanism whereby the autonomy of the will - 
the source of all subjective law and the major principle 
of the contract - was to be guaranteed by rules of law 
promulgared by the bureaucratic administration or by 
parliament. This is how in law the notion of the 19th 
century liberal state was expressed. The rights of the 
individual are powers lying within his own will: the
rule of law has value only to the extent that its object 
is to protect subjective rights. In this connection, 
objective right has its foundation in subjective right. 
The backbone of the legal system is the civil law, the 
pillars of which are Articles 544, 1134 and 1382. From 
Article 544 the attempt is made to show that property is 
absolute; from Article 1134 the absolute freedom of 
contracting parties is deduced as the sole source of 
obligations, limited only by themselves, by
"self-limitation" of the will. "The 1789 Revolution 
broke the links which, under the Ancien Regime, bound 
the individual to the state; it thereby opened an age 
of individualism. That is the whole spirit of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man" (C. Deudant). This 
opinion is fairly classical, and will summarizes the 
most widely shared view of what 1789 meant. We know 
that it is erroneous; that the point was rationalism 




























































































association suppressed (see above), but, likewise, the 
foundation of a limited company was made subordinate to 
an authorization granted or refused at the discretion of 
the administration (until 1867). The republic was to 
teach that the freedom presupposes freedom of 
association; the freedom of the 19th-century liberal 
state was opposed to the freedom of association also 
through the bias of its administrative and bureaucratic 
apparatus whereby the subject was milled and moulded.
There was, by the way, no logical reason in the legal 
area to proclaim the sovereignty of the subject and its 
ascendancy over the state apparatus. After all, while 
Article 544 certainly affirms the absolute character of 
property, the same article states at the end: " .., 
provided that no use prohibited by law or regulation is 
made of it." Article 1134 certainly proclaims 
contracutal freedom and assuredly gives it legal value, 
but inasmuch as such agreements have been "legally 
formed". It is therefore quite clear from these two key 
articles of liberal law that the subject was to be 
recognized to the extent that it would sacrifice to the 
commands proceeding from the administrative and 
bureaucratic sphere. The liberal perception took origin 
from an economic and political interest, but law as such 
in no way expressed that, while even case law and 
doctrine sang to the same tune. We might continue the 




























































































subject effects to the public sphere; for instance, 
Article 6 of the Civil Code, where clauses and 
conventions contrary to public order or good morals are 
made null. Let us consider the importance of the state 
intervention allowed by Article 6 in contractual 
provisions. Article 6 has, furthermore, its corollary 
in the extension of the public sphere itself into civil 
society, within this society based on trade; article 
1131 declares void any agreement without cause, on a 
false cause or on an illicit cause. (Article 1133 tells 
us that illicit means contrary to law, good morals or 
public order). We well know the results of the theory 
of cause; an evaluation of the worth of a legal act. 
This means that, for instance, the act need not be 
inspired by a motive contrary to the general interest. 
M. Waline (101) makes the most absolute criticism of 
this "liberal" reading: "If Article 1134 did not exist, 
our law would not be what it is, but a different law". 
It is in any case probable that one would set about 
inventing it. "The idea of an autonomous will capable 
of producing legal effects by itself is in absolute 
contradiction with the existence of Article 1134, which 
has the precise effect of rendering that will 
heteronomous". We might say exactly the same thing of 
property law. It was only the first subparagraph of 
that article that was taken into account in the 19th 
century, whereas with the republic and the social State 




























































































was to be paid attention to (102). With the republic, 
there came about a political blending between the aspect 
of the subject and the aspect of the object: "public 
regulation and private initiative are the two terms of 
the ambivalence that characterizes the authority/subject 
relationship". The principle of the autonomy of the 
will as the foundation of the state based on the rule of 
law was no longer to be applied.
"The individualist doctrine, once considered destined 
for considerable growth, can not be considered as 
anything but a historical phase from which society has 
begun to move away for some time now" (103). A 
redistribution of roles is then effected. "The social 
institution can have no other object than to tend 
towards the perfecting of the species, and the 
individual ought not to have any other than to tend 
towards the perfecting of the social institution" (104).
Hauriou (105) was to say in this connection: "At any 
given moment, a certain equilibrium is established 
between the social forces, and it is from that 
equilibrium that the rule of law in force at a given 
moment is born. Each liberal rule of law is a sort of 
clause in a treaty of armistice between the social 
forces " Among these antagonistic forces, Hauriou is 
thinking chiefly of society and the individual; two 




























































































of man outside the society of the State, nor of human 
society without human individuals".
The modern state can then be seen as a "legal 
equilibrium based on individualism". Hauriou picks out 
from this two major categories at the heart of the law: 
a social law elaborated in the political institution in 
the double form of discipline and statute, and an 
individualist law constituted principally in the usages 
of judicial intercourse
The problem of the sources of law then arises. For 
Hauriou, social law has its origin in the legal creative 
power of the institutions, and individualist law in the 
independence of the will. Does this mean that there is 
a duality of sources of the law, one coming from the 
public sphere, the other from the state apparatus, 
operating in parallel? Hauriou inclines to a negative 
answer: there can be no parallelism; there can only be 
a blending, to which he gives us the key. The subject 
acts within the limits set for him by the state, which 
in turn realizes the general interest; there is the 
metaphor of the state as a huge park within which 
traffic is organized and rationalized, and which is 
closed upon itself. The individual is free to move 
about within it, provided he keeps off the flowerbeds 
and avoids forbidden paths (106). As M. Waline pointed 




























































































but its objective: the sole source becomes the state 
(107). The definition of the law is once again posed, 
orienting us either towards the source (state) or 
towards the objective (individual).
Hauriou's image of the state as a closed park is very 
powerful. It was what 1789 achieved. The whole social 
sphere became a closed word tied down within the bonds 
of the state, and therfore any legality it was because 
the state based on the rule of law intended to be the 
kingdom of that law which governs both the individual 
and the State. But how can the state's sovereignty be 
reconciled with its neccessary submission to the law? 
Liberal doctrine was aimed at providing an answer: 
because the State results from the social contract, it 
is subject to the laws freely accepted by the 
individuals. But the proposition falls as soon as the 
State becomes the sole source of law, leaving only the 
notion of self-limitation (as in Jellinek or Carre de 
Malberg), which takes the form of a syllogism: it is 
part of the very definition of the State for it to have 
a juridical organization, but the State cannot evade a 
law without denying its nature; therefore the State can 
only wish to submit to the law. The individual becomes 
the objective of this rule, which expresses only the 
general interest.




























































































him, selflimitation is little more than a joke. For 
him, the neccessary condition of the subordination of 
the State to the law could result only from a law with a 
source outside of and anterior to the State (to the will 
of the legislature or of any organ of the State). In 
other words, the legal value of a rule is not extrinsic 
and formal but intrinsic or material. For Duquit, the 
obligatory character of a rule was not to originate in 
its formulation by a State authority but in its 
conformity to the needs of social. solidarity and of 
justice. " On the positive ground, I seek to determine 
only the time when a certain rule of which the mass of 
individuals in a social group has a more or less clear 
awareness becomes a rule of law".
However, the whole of social life is under the 
ascendancy of the State, the state sphere and the public 
sphere to which Duguit refers. M. Waline can easily 
make the following remark: "But what is a positive law? 
It is an effectively applied law" and this operation 
depends solely on the State.
One final question then arises: can there be a creation 
of subjective rights by individual wills, through the 
operation of the judicial act? In a rather 
contradictory fashion, Hauriou answers yes. His concern 
for liberalism induced him to put forward the autonomy 




























































































source of law came from the State was rather 
incompatible with that. For Duquit, on the other hand, 
the answer was no: the legal effect came according to 
him from the law, but not from the subject, and the 
theory of the autonomy of the will worked out under the 
liberal state seem to him to amount to a kind of 
metaphysics of the subject. "There is no subjective 
right, but conditions determined by objective law", and 
the declaration of the will does nothing but condition 
the application of the law, (this gives the State 
considerable importance, since it proves to be the sole 
source of law).
We tend to think that the answer should be no: with the 
State acting as both instances, the public sphere and 
the State, all legal production can only be subordinated 
to it. Gounot (109) writes in this connection "... if 
society sanctions legal acts is this not because it 
feels itself concerned in them in certain respects, 
because it sees in the legally formed contract something 
welcome in itself, an individual cooperation in the 
general interest and in social solidarity? .. that in 
consequence, the foundation and the measure of the 
contractual obligation are to be sought not so much in 
the will itself as in the conformity of the willed act 
with the ideal that the legislator has formulated of the 
social order of justice?" The idea is immensely rich: 




























































































State) sanctions legal acts by tending fundamentally to 
express the interest it finds in them as having been 
carried out under conditions that it has itself laid 
down ("legally formed"). On the other hand, the 
autonomy of the will is no longer the "foundation and 
measure" of the contractual obligation: the latter 
reflects individual cooperation in the general interest. 
This is to turn upside down 19th-century jurisprudence, 
which sought in the intention of the parties the scope 
of the obligation: henceforth it is proposed that we 
evaluate the extent to which this individual intention 
might not be in contradiction with "the social order 
desired by the legislator". The theory of the cause of 
the contract here takes on its whole importance.
This perception, which has the virtue of logic, 
nevertheless has a great defect. It reduces the public 
sphere to very little! This may be the case in its 
political dimension, but the reduction is compensated 
for by a surge of publicity which becomes propaganda 
(see above). It was possible to produce the political 
illusion, but the legal one can be only with much 
greater difficulty: when one is prevented from making a 
contract according to one's intentions, one can hardly 
be prevented from seeing the fact. This is all the more 
clearly felt because the State based on the rule of law 
functions on the image of the sovereign subject. 




























































































of the contract as "mixed act" (110). Going back to 
Duquit's idea of the conditional act, M. Waline sets 
out the double means whereby the contract takes on the 
effect of law; the contract "triggers off a legal 
status" to the extent that the contract comes into a 
category for which the law has laid down rules of public 
order and where the parties have not made derogations 
from the model rules laid down in the code". "For the 
surplus, and only for the surplus, the contracting 
parties create a situation that they themselves imagine, 
"... that is the measure of the individualization of 
their contract".
Firstly, this attempt suffers from a logical erroi 
doubtless the effect of Article 1134 of the Civil Code 
is to render the contractual will heteronomous, but this 
characteristic is in no way dialectical. That would be 
to forget Article 6 of the Civil Code and Articles 
1131-1133. "In the last instance", the contractual will 
is expressed according to the maxim: "everything which
is not forbidden is allowed". This is to recognize the 
primary role of law, and not a contradictory equality 
between two supposedly mutually enriching aspects.
Secondly, the relationship between subjective and 
objective situation brought about by the legal act is no 
more fixed than that brought about between the political 




























































































based on the rule of law; it is evolutionary by nature. 
These two relationships express the same thing.
The trend that can be picked out from this relationship 
within a contractual situation was, moreover, already 
perceived by M. Waline: "The objective character tends 
increasingly to dominate contractual situations as 
legislative intervention (111) becomes more frequent and 
more important. The content of the situation is 
increasingly exclusively described by objective law" 
(112). This is also the trend that seems to emerge from 
the evolutionary relationship between the two aspects of 
the State based on the rule of law. In this connection, 
Andre Hauriou wrote: "Is it impermissible to think 
that, despite the extraordinary conquests of modern 
science or perhaps because of them, (113) we are on our 
way - both east and west - towards a sort of generalized 
equalitarianization of conditions, guaranteed by a 
strong administrative organization in which there is 
littel room for liberty ". (114). The State based on 
the rule of law tends to be the end of liberty in order 
to maintain equality. We have shown how and why: 
because of the effect of rationalism.
M. Waline has pointed out (115) that "the exception of 
illegality severely limits arbitrariness, i.e. the 
discretionary power of administrative authorities; 




























































































exception that just as much limits the autonomy of the 
will of contracting parties" and that in this connection 
"there is no great difference between the situations of 
public law (situation of an offical) and the contractual 
situations of private law" (116).
To this we are tempted to reply that there is no reason 
why it should be any different: as a process of 
rationalization, the State based on the rule of law 
organizes an authority sphere within which 
administrative law intends to be a mechanism governing 
objects and a public sphere where criticism is 
transformed into social integration and where the rule 
of law intends to bring about order. To this extent, 
instead of saying "illegality exception" (posited by 
Article 1134 of the Civil Code) we preferred to say 
"principle of legality on the sole basis of which a 
subjective right can be founded"
This is not to say the same thing while simply reversing 
the terms of the proposition. The illegality exception 
is not a limit to arbitrariness, but a way of 
excercising it: the law organizes an authority 
relationship , which means that it delimits an area of 
objective execution of duty. Any action by a subject 
carried out outside this area would than be considered 




























































































However, these two spheres are by nature different, and 
this what in the last instance makes their difference. 
The public sphere remains the locus of "creative 
psychology", where "everything which is not forbidden" 
has only to be done. Conversely, the State apparatus is 
the locus of the "directive", whose goal we know to be 
to pick out a conformable attitude where the texts lay 
down nothing. The directive is the opposite of the 
maxim whereby "everything that is not forbidden is 
allowed". The law's desire to rationalize everything, 
to provide for everything, in order to secure the 
advantage of effectiveness is, to be sure, the same 
whether it is exercised in the public sphere or within 
the State apparatus, but it has to cope with two totally 
different attitudes: one constituted of submission, the 
other of submission but also transcendence. It is 
within this narrow limit that, if the State based on the 
rule of law is a way of emerging from domination, it may 
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